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Starting from the critical review of various motivational frameworks of change that have
been applied to the study of eating disorders, the present paper provides an alternative
conceptualization of the change in psychotherapy presenting a single-case study.We ana-
lyzed six psychotherapeutic conversations with a bulimic patient and found out narratives
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INTRODUCTION
Existential difficulties and psychological disorders bring states of
malaise which sometimes become so serious as to arouse the wish
to modify the conditions causing them, through psychothera-
peutic intervention. Indeed, the theoretical proposition capable
of summing up the plausibility of any psychotherapeutic treat-
ment is “You need to change.” However, this need for change does
not guarantee satisfaction because it depends on the variable and
sometimes conflicting meanings of change.
In the literature, various motivational approaches have been
developed in an attempt to prevent patients from dropping out
of treatment, to increase their active engagement and, hence,
to improve the short-term and long-term outcome of therapy.
We shall discuss the theme of change departing from the analy-
sis of different conceptualizations of motivation for change and
introducing some semiotic positions.
APPROACHES TO MOTIVATION
THE WILL IS TO SAY: “I CAN START AGAIN”
Arendt (1978) analyzed the will as a springboard for action and as
an “organ of the future.” She illustrated how this faculty to trigger
something new, and so to “change the world,” can function in the
world of appearances. The comparison among various philosoph-
ical positions – from Epictetus to Duns Scotus, from Stuart Mill to
Nietzsche (1882) – led this student of Heidegger (1982) to attempt
to overcome Kant’s rather awkward definition of the will as the
power to spontaneously originate a series of successive things or
states. Arendt (1978) noted that just as thinking prepares the self
for a role as a spectator, so the will shapes it into a “durable self”
which orients all the single acts of the will. Since the will creates the
character of the self, we are able to interpret it as principium indi-
viduationis: the source of the person’s specific identity. However,
she continued, this very individualization as produced by the will
creates a serious new problem for the idea of “freedom.” Shaped
by the will and aware that he might be different from what he/she
is (unlike body appearance, talents, and aptitudes, the character is
not produced by the self at birth), the individual always tends to
assert a“myself”opposed to an indeterminate“they”: all the others
who I as an individual am not. Arendt (1978) believed that noth-
ing can be more frightening than a solipsistic notion of freedom
(p. 523).
The recommendation to rely on “men of action” more than
“professional thinkers” (philosophers or scientists) clearly shows
that freedom (political freedom, not philosophical) is an“attribute
not of I-want, but of I-can” (Arendt, 1978, p. 528). Political action
takes shape in the individuals’ awareness that since they have only
limited power available to them, they can aspire only to a limited
freedom. The problem involved in “men of action,” i.e., persons
who want to “change the world” (if only “their” inner world), is the
enigma of the beginning, which puts them “face to face with the
abyss of liberty.” To be open to change means to acknowledge that
“the very nature of any beginning is to bear an element of complete
arbitrariness”(Arendt,1978,p. 535). Change induced by the begin-
ning of something – whatever that thing might be – implies that it
might not have been and, at the same time, once produced, that it
can no longer be destroyed (at least not totally). The experience of
www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 546 | 1
Salvini et al. A dialogical analysis of change
conversion, marvelously told in Augustine’s Confessions, favored
the intuition that self-change represents the will to be reborn;
this awareness values the fragile liberty of the beginnings, of the
initiative.
This overview on the seminal theory of will proposed by
Arendt aims at supporting a dialogical view of change. Accord-
ing to this viewpoint, change follows the specific Self ’s rhetoric
of the “beginnings” which founds human liberty. Resistance to
change, instead, derives from the slavery of repeating, which
traps the dialogical Self. The tension between “change” (liberty of
reborn) and “resistance to change” (self-determination to repeti-
tion) can be also represented as voices discussing and contrasting
in the context of a personal arena, in the dynamic of a dialog
between Parts (“the Selves”). These varying manifestations of the
will can be discovered in certain “psycho-discursive practices”
which characterize specific interpretative repertoires of subjec-
tivity (Greimas, 1983; Gergen, 2009). Psychotherapy represents
also a privileged laboratory to investigate and discover exchange
in the relationship between voices, and also to understand in
which way people change, amplifying the role of some voices
and reducing the impact of others (Wetherell, 2008; Faccio et al.,
2012b).
TELLING HIMSELF/HERSELF TO WILL SOMETHING
In the transition from modern to post-modern psychology,
change-oriented motivation may be inserted in a dialogical con-
ception of the “self.” From our research standpoint, the expression
of a thought or intention, the utterance of a sentence or the doing
of a deed, do not arise from previously well-formed, orderly cog-
nitive processes at the center of our being. Instead, they originate
amidst a person’s vague, diffuse, unordered feelings: from their
sense of how, semiotically, “they are ‘positioned’ in relation to the
others around them”(Shotter, 1993a, p. 63). As James (1890) wrote
“feelings of tendency” are “signs of direction” in thought. In this
sense, feeling is a phenomenon of the semiotic threshold, uniting
the person with his or her surroundings.
The concept of “semiotic position” recalls Vygotsky’s (1962)
idea that signs mediate all higher mental activities. Researchers
need to expand upon the nature of signs that serve to establish,
maintain, and alter the position. Words do have the power to posi-
tion the speaker with regard to his or her addressees. Finding
themselves in a newly assigned position, the discourses will then
create responses in order to express their “feeling” about the posi-
tion and, perhaps, to move into a new position: one that they find
more appropriate.
In light of a critical review of literature on this theme (Vygot-
sky, 1962; Bakhtin, 1981, 1984; Volosinov, 1987; Shotter, 1993a,b;
Cheyne and Tarulli, 1999), we shall discuss several suggestions
regarding the analysis of semiotic positions through discourse
analysis. In particular, we shall take into account implications
pertinent to the psychological practice (Vidotto et al., 2006;
Romaioli et al., 2008).
WHAT IS CHANGE? HOW DO PEOPLE CHANGE?
In everyday speech, “change” is seen as a contrast to permanence;
the two are considered as complementary opposites. Nevertheless,
identity implies both change and permanence. “Change” and
“non-change”narratives are strictly linked to motivational rhetoric
expressing will and determination: “he or she is not ready for
change” “he or she hasn’t decided to change yet,” “unless he or
she decides to change, no one can help him/her.”
This assumption is the basis for many theoretical models that
explore the theme of change; we shall briefly mention some of
them; in particular we chose four of the most cited models in the
literature on change in psychotherapy.
Miller and Rollnick (1991) defined motivation as“the probabil-
ity that a person will enter into, continue, and adhere to a specific
change strategy” (p. 19). The authors developed a motivational
interview (MI) which yielded cumulative insights aiming to help
clients become proactive participants in therapy. They assumed
that clients possess a powerful potential for change, the clinician’s
task is to evoke and strengthen this inner resourcefulness, thereby
enhancing the intrinsic motivation for change which is inherent
in the individual. This inner growth process is facilitated when the
clinician skilfully applies the following four key principles: express-
ing empathy, developing discrepancy, increasing self-efficacy, and
rolling with resistance.
Inspired by the MI of Miller and Rollnick (1991); Vitousek et al.
(1998) proposed the Socratic method, which is well known in cog-
nitive therapy as a tool for enhancing motivation for change. The
approach involves being empathetic toward the patient’s expe-
riences, as reflected in his acknowledgment of the symptoms’
possible functions, and recognizing that changing one’s behavior
is a difficult task. The therapist offers an encouraging framework
so that patients can reach conclusions on their own concerning
the origin of their symptoms, or the pros and cons of change. The
basic assumption is that when a decision to change one’s behavior
is experienced as being personally taken rather than imposed by
the therapist, the effects of the actual behavioral change will be
more lasting.
Another popular approach is the trans-theoretical model of
change (TMC; Prochaska and DiClemente, 1982; DiClemente,
1999). The primary goal of this model is to describe the different
stages through which patients advance in their movement toward
lasting change. People are said to move from pre-contemplation
(not considering change at all), to contemplation (weighing the
pros and cons of change), to preparation (getting ready to make
the change), to action (making the change), and to maintenance
(consolidating the positive change). This change process is consid-
ered to be cyclical rather than linear in nature. Clinicians can help
patients to reach higher-level stages by increasing their internal (or
intrinsic) motivation as opposed to their external (or extrinsic)
motivation toward change.
The Self-Determination Theory (SDT, by Ryan and Deci, 2000)
is a theory of human motivation and personality. It focuses pri-
marily on the quality of motivation, claiming that two different
types of high-quality motivation can be distinguished: intrinsic
motivation and internalized extrinsic motivation. An adequate
analysis of motivational dynamics might well take into account
the degree to which the change has been internalized rather than
being experienced as pleasurable or exciting (i.e., intrinsic motiva-
tion). Although an activity might be initiated by the person rather
than by external pressures, some types of internal motivation are
less likely to yield lasting benefits because the behavioral regulation
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is insufficiently anchored within people’s value structures. It is also
necessary to investigate the degree to which the change represents a
true expression of patients’ personal values (identification) rather
than being instigated by internal obligations (introjection). SDT
also considers the quality of motivation for change, alongside the
quantity.
Although they represent different approaches, these clini-
cal models share three fundamental theoretical presuppositions
(Romaioli et al., 2008):
1. Motivation is intended as a cognitive quality, whose persistence
is ensured by means of predominantly intra-psychic heuristics
(the individualistic proposition); and the act of evaluation is
regarded as a calculated choice based on important, essentially
logical rules. In this concept of motivation, every action must
have its psychological antecedents (whether beliefs, desires, or
intentions), which have a cause-effect relationship with the
behavior itself. As Searle (2001) critically noted,“there is a long
tradition in philosophy (and psychology) according to which
in the case of rational action, if the psychological antecedents
of the act are all in order, that is, they are the right kind of
desires, intentions, value, judgment, etc., then the act must nec-
essarily follow” (p. 220). Observers usually interpret a lack or
decrease in motivation (as in relapses) simply as “weakness of
the will” (Elstrup, 2009). No possibility is provided that peo-
ple may act paradoxically, performing actions which are not
in accordance with their best judgment, the so-called “akrasia”
(Vidotto et al., 2006, 2010; Romaioli et al., 2008; Faccio, 2011,
2012; Faccio et al., 2011a). In everyday life we find numerous
examples of such “will inconsistency,” often designated as the
“akratic phenomenon”; for instance: If someone really wants to
quit smoking, why do they persist in lighting up after a meal? If
a person is madly in love with someone, how in the world can
they be unfaithful, leave them, or hurt them?
2. Carrying out an action against one’s own will is assumed to
be the effect of an impulse which makes an individual give in
to temptation; in conversation (a few minutes after the fall)
the lapse may translate into a personality trait: “laziness,”“star-
vation,” or “weak will.” No one considers the possibility that
in the past, a person might have desired something differ-
ent from what he/she now desires, since he/she had different
thoughts and motivations. Memories from the past are recon-
structed by adapting them to the present. Without the context
and the situation which generated an event, however, can we
really reconstruct its original meaning? Memories are not fixed
photographs, they are mobile. It is not enough to have good
memory in order to have reliable memories. Even the past
changes, for its configuration depends on our present feeling
and narratives (Faccio et al., 2012a; Romaioli and Contarello,
2012; Romaioli and Faccio, 2012; Castiglioni et al., 2013).
3. The third issue is a conceptualization of “change” as if it were
an object. Often, we are unaware of the conditions which make
us change. In most cases, even after change, it is very dif-
ficult to reconstruct the process of change. There is not “a
sure route to change,” but there are many narratives for rep-
resenting change which are consistent with the theory that the
person believes in. We know little of change as it occurs in
our lives, but we can produce wonderful narratives about it.
What appears is a linear path, because we believe in the per-
manence of meanings. In other words, we imagine the mind
as being universal and unchangeable. Bruner (1987, 1991), in
speaking about the relationship between experience and the
narration of experiences, noted that when a person tells a
story, he arbitrarily imposes a logical sense and logical mean-
ings on the stream of consciousness, highlighting some events
and ignoring others (Lacasa et al., 2005). Therefore, narra-
tives construe the world according to the narrative style we
use to describe it. Change derives from the theories about it,
and even therapists will stick to the narratives about change
that they believe in, just as patients will choose their own
narratives.
“CHANGE” AND “NON-CHANGE” AS THE EFFECT OF A DIALOG
BETWEEN VOICES
In line with a narrative perspective, Hermans (1996, 2001); Her-
mans et al. (1993) proposed a decentralized conception of the self
as multi-voiced and dialogical. More specifically, they defined the
dialogical self in terms of a “dynamic multiplicity of I-positions,
or voices in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this mind
is with the minds of other people. Positions are not only ‘internal’
(e.g., I as a man, white, Catholic) but also ‘external,’ belonging to
the extended domain of the self (e.g., my wife, my children, my
colleagues)” (Hermans et al., 1993, p. 78). Dialogs may take place
between or among internal positions (e.g., a conflict between my
position as a father and my position as a hardworking scientist),
between internal and external positions (e.g., I discuss our shared
project with my colleague John), and between or among external
positions (e.g., disagreement among my teachers on religious top-
ics). The dialogical self is not only part of the broader society, but
also functions, itself, as a “society of mind” with tensions, conflicts,
and contradictions as intrinsic features of a (healthily functioning)
self (Hermans, 2002). Building on the views of figures like Bakhtin
(1981, 1984); James (1890); Mead (1934), we envision a multi-
voiced dialogical self involved in internal interchanges between
I-positions that desire change, and I-positions that oppose change
(Ecker and Hulley, 2000, 2008; Cipolletta et al., 2010; Cipolletta,
2011, in press).
WHAT IS DOMINANCE BETWEEN VOICES?
In common sense the notion of dialog differs from the notion of
dominance. Usually, dialog evokes an image of people discussing
their views and problems as perfectly equal partners (Hermans
et al., 1993). For any dominance to arise in such a situation, it
is merely the power of arguments that counts. Such a concep-
tion of dialog, however, truly applies only to an ideal dialogical
situation. In apparent opposition to this image, Linell (1990)
has argued that asymmetry (or dominance) exists in each sin-
gle act–response sequence: the actors continually alternate the
roles of “power holder” and “object of power” in the course
of their dialog. As long as one party speaks, the other party is
required to be silent. As long as the dominant party talks, the
subordinate party allows his or her contributions to be directed,
controlled, or inhibited by the interlocutor’s moves (interactional
dominance).
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Moreover, one party can predominantly introduce and main-
tain topics and perspectives on topics (topic dominance). The
amount of talk reflects dominance relationships as well: the
party who talks a lot prevents the other party from taking
his turn. Finally, the speaker who makes the most strategic
moves may have a strong impact on a conversation without
needing to talk a lot. In other words, although the topic of a
meaningful conversation is under mutual control, relative dom-
inance is not extrinsic but rather intrinsic to the dialogical
process.
The more symmetrical the dialogs is, the more opportunity
it provides for mutual influence; the more asymmetrical it is,
the more it constrains the exchange of views and experiences.
From a clinical point of view the excessive dominance of one voice
over another may be a dysfunctional characteristic of the dialog-
ical self (Dimaggio, 2006). A voice may become dominant for a
long period of life. As Hermans et al. (1993) remind us in citing
Linell (1990), the dominance in interaction is multidimensional.
There are many ways in which a party can be said to “dominate,”
that is, to control the “territory” shared by the interactants in
communication.
“I AND THE OTHER PART OF ME WHO DOESN’T WANT ME TO
CHANGE”: A CLINICAL EXAMPLE
As an example, we shall now consider a clinical case. Carlotta
is a 23 years old woman diagnosed with an anorexic disorder of
bulimic subtype. She’s studying at the university, with the desire
to become an archeologist and is living with her parents and two
brothers. She started starving herself and lost 8 kg during the pre-
vious 2 years. At the beginning of psychotherapy Carlotta was
experiencing intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even
though she was seriously underweight. The girl was checking the
number of calories consumed by restricting or exercising with the
sole purpose of losing weight, but at the expense of friendships,
homework, and other responsibilities. Carlotta never referred to
having forced vomiting. She met a psychiatrist some time ago but
this meeting did not help her, later she began psychotherapy on
her own initiative.
During therapy the girl started to specify that her conflict with
food was characterized by totally different mood, depending on
the day: “Sometime I’m positive and in balance, I can eat pasta or
pizza without any problem, but after that, suddenly, it comes out
one other me, who make me feel guilty.” Carlotta calls her negative
voice by the name of “Rebecca” describing her as “the other part of
me – who doesn’t want me to change.” Rebecca, her biggest enemy,
makes feel her guilty every time she eat something.
Carlotta chose the name “Rebecca” because it was the name
her mother might have given her instead of Carlotta. “Rebecca”
forces Carlotta to go running every time she has eaten something,
she prevents Carlotta from going out for dinner, she prohibits
Carlotta from sitting down to eat and relaxing, without worrying
about calories. Rebecca is the personification of the problem. The
interaction between the two is perceived as a fight.
CURRENT STUDY
Overcoming a cognitive approach to motivation for change, in
the present study we focused on the “psycho-discursive practices”
(Wetherell, 2008) revealing the way in which people frame their
will to change. We aim to describe the progress of treatment which
focus on the power of metaposition in order to support the dialog-
ical self ’s need to change. The metaposition allows the individual
to take a “metaperspective” (Hermans, 2006), permitting him or
her to evaluate and organize other positions, see the way they
are linked, and maintain a vision of the whole, thereby fostering
change.
CASE STUDY
TEXTS ANALYSES
The treatment has been developed according to the dialogic self
theory by one of the author as a therapist. The transcripts of
six therapeutic sessions, lasting 1 h each, have been analyzed by
investigating ways in which various discursive changes modify the
framing of the will to overcome eating disorder, from the first
session (first, second, and third colloquia) to the last (fifth and
sixth). We traced the trend toward discursive change during the
therapeutic process according to the four dimensions suggested by
Hermans et al. (1993).
1. Interactional dominance, consisting of symmetrical or asym-
metrical patterns in initiative-response structures. The domi-
nant party “is the one who makes the most initiatory moves.
The subordinate party allows, or must allow, his or her con-
tributions to be directed, controlled, or inhibited by the
interlocutor’s moves” (Hermans et al., 1993, p. 75).
2. Topic dominance, “one party predominantly introduces and
maintains topics and perspectives on topics. By determining
the topic of a conversation, an interlocutor may achieve a high
degree of dominance that may be visible not only in terms of
the content of the talk, but also in terms of the direction that
the conversation takes as a whole” (Hermans et al., 1993, p. 75).
3. Amount of talk: which characteristics (number of words, use
of open or closed questions) consent to investigate the dom-
inating and the subordinating party (Hermans et al., 1993, p.
76).
4. Strategic movements: any kind of linguistic device which
influences the direction and results of discourse; i.e., the
use of persuasive, metaphorical language, grammar, or verbal
formulas.
We chose a specific pattern of Discourse Analysis with the inten-
tion of identifying any linguistic variations which might signal
transition from dysfunctional self-narratives to more organized
ones. Being inspired by Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) model, our
analysis aimed to single out any discursive devices that might reveal
the presence of distinct voices amidst the speech of therapy clients.
We chose this type of analysis as the most suitable to consider
the linguistic aspects defined as the consistent goal of research,
our inquiry focused in fact on the structure of the tenses at the
syntactical level (Van Dijk, 1998), with particular attention to cat-
egories as the pronouns, verbal tenses and forms, adverbs of time,
the presence or absence of subordinate clauses, if-clauses, etc. We
followed two different pathways. At the utterance level, we collated
the multifarious wordings between or among the various speak-
ing positions (or “voices”) of the self, and at the temporal level
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we contrasted texts produced at the beginning (first, second, and
third conversation) and at the end of the therapy (fifth and sixth
conversation).
In addition, a modern content analysis was carried out on the
texts of the first and the sixth session of therapy using software Sys-
tème pour l’Analyse des Données (SPAD) and a quali-quantitative
approach (Lebart and Salem, 1988). These analyses had two aims:
first, to ascertain whether the purely hermeneutic “pen and paper”
analysis used in the previous phase would be borne out by a more
sophisticated computer analysis; second, to identify from the texts
a specific lexicon in relation to the voice of the client occupying
the scene in the dialog (Carlotta-Rebecca-Metaposition) and in
relation to the time of the interview (beginning, end of therapy).
The analysis was carried out in order to identify vocabulary
which was more characteristic of one voice of the individual with
respect to another, and to trace out a change in the client’s style of
response, from one time to the next (Murakami, 2010; Faccio et al.,
2011b, 2012b). The Vospec (specific vocabularies) procedure from
the software Spad was applied to the texts, which were pre-treated
so as to define the precise usage of particular terms. This involved:
1. keeping homographs separate and grouping synonyms
together;
2. eliminating words considered irrelevant to the analysis fol-
lowing three main criteria: (a) words with no significance in
relation to the research objectives were eliminated (e.g., con-
junctions and prepositions such as but, and, with etc.); (b)
low frequency words were eliminated (one occurrence or less);
(c) words unrelated to the specific research questions were
eliminated;
3. creating equivalences among different verbs having the same
tense. In this way, we created categories distinguishing positive
and negative modal verbs, verbs in the imperative, conditional,
past, and present indicative;
4. creating equivalences by uniting nouns used to describe emo-
tional states, which were classified either as “positive emotions”
or “negative emotions.”
Through the Vospec procedure, specificity measures were
obtained indicating to what extent certain words were char-
acteristic of one group compared to the other. The analy-
sis generated frequency tables, such as that reported in the
Results section below, showing the characteristic words of Car-
lotta’s voice compared to Rebecca’s voice and the Metaposi-
tion, as well as the vocabulary typical of the first section
compared to the last section of the therapy (the terms are
listed in order of significance; the column “global frequency”
indicates how often the words appear in the entire docu-
ments; the column “internal frequency” indicates how often the
words appear in a specific group). The value test measures
the deviation between the percentage of a graphical form in a
class and its total percentage. The significance level is fixed at
p < 0.05.
PERSONAL NARRATIVES
The presentation of the results of the discursive analysis is orga-
nized in four sections. The first two sections report the analyses
of the four dimensions suggested by Hermans et al. (1993) at the
beginning and at the end of the treatment, respectively. In the
third section a comparison between these two phases is conducted
by highlighting the role of assuming a metaposition in order to
grasp the therapeutic function. Finally, in the fourth section the
discursive construction of change during therapy is presented.
DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SESSIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF
THERAPY
Interactional dominance in the first clinical session
Rebecca’s voice is definitively predominant. In terms of the
initiative-response structure, Rebecca’s voice prevails over Car-
lotta’s, who says as example: “I know Rebecca and I know
what happens afterward. To avoid suffering afterward, I avoid
beforehand.”
Rebecca sometimes predicts Carlotta’s actions and prevents
them. Carlotta is directed, controlled, or inhibited by Rebecca’s
moves. Nevertheless, the other party is still able to have her say,
limited as that may be, and at times manages to fight against the
dominant voice: “There are days when I’m really positive, really
happy and so I say ‘I’m going to beat Rebecca’, other days I’m a bit
sadder and a bit more tired and worried and so she wins.”
By way of linguistic analysis, we can affirm that the speaker
here does not identify with Rebecca: the voice uses the third per-
son singular and addresses Carlotta with “you” (the second person
singular). In contrast, Carlotta’s voice speaks in the first person
singular and always in the present-tense.
Topic dominance in the first clinical session
It is Rebecca who predominantly introduces and maintains topics
and perspectives. The dominance is visible not only in terms of
talk content, but also in terms of the direction that the action then
takes: “Look! Now you’ve eaten the pizza and now you have to stay
behind.”
Rebecca only has one topic, that of anticipating or making up
for a dieting “slip-up,” but it is more important than anything
Carlotta thinks. Carlotta is especially restricted because the domi-
nating party does not require an answer, but only obedience: “You
have to make up for what you did that day”; “Do it! All you have to
do is go jogging.”
Amount of talking and strategic moves in the first clinical session
Carlotta says: “nine out of 10 times Rebecca jumps out.” Such
restricted responses may also be the result of the interlocutor’s
prestige or style of questioning (suggestive of answers or Socratic
method). It is not necessary to talk a great deal: when someone
says few things, but strategically important, the direction and the
resulting insights may be heavily influenced.
Rebecca says few strategically important things, she uses logical,
rational strategies, based on convincing demonstrations of cause-
effect: “There, now you’ve eaten pizza, so tomorrow you’ll have to cut
back because without a doubt you’ve put on a lot of weight.” Even
the temporal adverbs that characterize her speech (“now get up,”
“tomorrow go jogging,” “yesterday you ate”) signify that only one
definition of time is possible: the present is planned in relation
to the past and future. Conditional clauses and imperative forms
(“you can eat if you go jogging tomorrow”) contribute to giving the
dialog a sense of necessity.
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As confirmed by the SPAD analyses, as Table 1 shows, Rebecca’s
voice uses mainly verbs in the imperative mode, or verbs indi-
cating necessity, command (you must go jogging, you must stay
behind, you must do, stay on a diet, go running. . .); they form
propositions which bind Carlotta to experiences of obedience and
restriction. In the vocabulary attributed to Rebecca, there also are
abundant instances of disapproval (that’s not good, don’t go run-
ning, your belly has gotten fatter. . .) and a recurrence of negative
moods (disappointment, disturbance, fear, guilt feelings, sense of
duty, anger. . .).
Carlotta does not employ such refined strategies, her speech is
characterized by modal verbs that, rather than strengthening each
other, weaken each other: “I tried to have a go at . . .,” “I manage a
bit more to. . ..” Most importantly, the SPAD analyses show that at
the beginning of therapy Carlotta mainly chooses negative forms
when using certain modal verbs (I cannot fight, I cannot imagine, I
cannot control. . .).
Here is a grammar of the “indefinite”: “before,” “after,” “for a
few months,” “a bit more,” “I used to eat anything without problems
anytime I wanted to.”
In these early exchanges between Rebecca and Carlotta we per-
ceive no true dialog, but rather, Rebecca’s imposition over Carlotta.
Rebecca is at the top of the hierarchy: she polarizes and dominates
the other voices.
DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SESSIONS AT THE END OF THERAPY
Interactional dominance at the end of therapy
During the final sessions of the therapy Rebecca makes herself
heard less and Carlotta manages to behave differently with regard
to food.
The voice of the Metaposition makes the most initial moves,
and then, a little at a time, becomes the mediator of the dialog
between the parts and the privileged interlocutor for Carlotta.
Sometimes the Metaposition prefers coordinate to subordinate
clauses; she doesn’t use the imperative form. We no longer have a
“monolog” by Rebecca, but a symmetrical dialog; the voice of the
Metaposition occupies a higher hierarchical position from which
to organize the exchange, favoring reciprocal interaction.
Topic dominance at the end of therapy
Rebecca tries to introduce and maintain topics and perspectives;
she has not disappeared, but now the equilibrium has changed:
dialog with the Metaposition sustains her.
Amount of talking at the end of therapy
Rebecca now talks less – “I haven’t heard from her for 7 days” –
whereas the Metaposition makes herself heard frequently.
Table 1 | Specific vocabulary from fragments of conversation
attributed to the voice of Rebecca.
Characteristic words
or segments
Internal
frequency
Global
frequency
Test-
value
p
Imperatives 17
Instances of disapproval 6 9 2.222 0.013
Negative emotions 12 29 1.599 0.055
Strategic movements at the end of therapy
Through the use of a particular style of questioning, the direction
and the resulting insights may be heavily influenced. The Meta-
position often requires only a “yes” or “no” answer, or brief replies
(Hermans et al., 1993). In general, in the latter part, a question-
answer type of dialogical structure prevails in the mediating voice
of the Metaposition.
Finally, if we compare Tables 2 and 3, we see that at the start of
therapy the use of negative modals prevailed (I cannot fight, I can’t
imagine, I can’t control), constructing a position identifying the
individual in such a way that she experience herself as incompe-
tent; a person swayed by continual failures as she attempts to keep
her resolutions. The abundant use of conditionals (I would have,
I could, I would like, I would do. . .) clearly reflects a tendency
to establish wishes and intentions concerning one’s behavior (I
could eat less, I’d like to do this. . .), only to find oneself unable
to respect them in practice. Such akratic experiences of failure
become a source of guilt for Carlotta, and they end up feeding
the severity and the escalation of demands developed by Rebecca.
As noted earlier, in fact, the negative voice makes abundant use
of disapproval (that’s not good, don’t go jogging, your belly has
gotten fatter. . .) and of imperatives (you must go for a run, you
must stay behind, you must do, stay on a diet, go running. . .). The
most harmful effect of such rhetorical strategies is to overshadow
the other voices and to prevent any dialogical exchange between
the positions.
At the end of treatment, instead, we see that in the client’s speech
the use of present-tense verbs become prevalent (I do, I think, I
want, I see, I feel. . .) along with positive modals and past-tense
verbs (I recovered, I decided, I stopped doing, I can ask myself, I can
say, I can. . .). These linguistic constructions denote the renewal of
a sense of “authorship”; and of the possibility to re-narrate one’s
experience in virtue of a retrieved decision-making capacity and
a more solidly formed sense of control. Finally, on the level of
personal experience, whereas at the start of treatment we per-
ceived a prevalence of stress-causing emotions, now there is more
Table 2 | Specific vocabulary from fragments of conversation at start
of therapy.
Characteristic words
or segments
Internal
frequency
Global
frequency
Test-
value
p
Negative modals 8 11 2.078 0.019
Instances of disapproval 5 9 0.773 0.220
Condizionale 9 19 0.650 0.258
Imperatives 17 39 0.620 0.268
Table 3 | Specific vocabulary from fragments of conversation at end of
therapy.
Characteristic words
or segments
Internal
frequency
Global
frequency
Test-
value
p
Present 61 79 3.024 0.001
Emotions: positive 18 26 0.543 0.294
Modals: positive 17 26 0.121 0.452
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room for positive emotions (strength, happiness, tranquil, serene,
secure, feel like laughing. . .). These are sometimes defined delib-
erately in relation to the absence of a negative mood, which was
present at first but has been overcome during the course of ther-
apy (less controlled, less rational, without feeling guilty, without
having to. . .).
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BEGINNING AND END OF THERAPY
During the final treatment sessions, the mode of interaction
between the voices changes thanks to a third “voice” that was
already present, albeit very weakly so: the metaposition. It uses
reflexive verbs (“I surprise myself,” “I control myself”) and it has,
grammatically speaking, a “reflexive function.” The auxiliary verbs
“to have to” and “to want to” are contrasted by an increasingly
intense use of verbs expressing the person’s condition (“I’m well”)
and sensations (“I feel okay,” “you don’t like”); the prevalent tense is
the past, which the speaker uses in reflecting about the differences
now emerging in her current situation (“I understood that . . .,” “I
allowed myself,” “once I used to say . . .”).
The SPAD analyses (Table 4) also show that the voice of “I the
therapist” uses mostly present-tense verbs (I do, I think, I want, I
see, I feel. . .) and positive modals or past-tense verbs (I recuperated,
I decided, I stopped doing, I can ask myself, I can say, I can. . .) which
indicate the affirmation of an active role in her experience, and a
consequent increase in the perceived sense of self-sufficiency.
The verbal formula “be+ gerund” marks the stages of a jour-
ney toward change, which is in progress: “I’m making a journey,”
“I’m realizing that I’m able to follow my feelings,” “Carlotta is com-
ing back.” This voice seems strong enough to oppose the dominant
position of Rebecca,and to effectively reorganize the self (Hermans
and Dimaggio, 2007).
DISCUSSION
A little at a time, the metaposition starts to use the first person sin-
gular (“I tell myself. . .”), thus assuming an increasingly important
role in the hierarchical organization of Carlotta’s dialogical self.
Nevertheless, it utilizes its dominance in a functional way, favoring
dialog, and mediating between the other positions. There is a more
symmetrical relationship between Rebecca and Carlotta: both have
the right to speak and be listened to, but the last word goes to the
voice that speaks from the metaperspective. For example: the psy-
chotherapist defines the qualities of the day using neither Carlotta’s
criteria (for her the day is “good” if she has eaten), nor those of
Rebecca, for whom the day may be “empty, full of nothing”; she
defines it merely as “particular.” The mediating voice also manages
a new flexibility when shifting from one position to another. “I
won’t let Rebecca do whatever she wants to me anymore. (. . .)
Lately I’ve been transforming the negative things that Rebecca
Table 4 | Specific vocabulary from fragments of conversation
attributed to the voice of “I-therapist.”
Characteristic words
or segments
Internal
frequency
Global
frequency
Test-
value
p
Present 55 79 4.458 0.000
Positive modals 16 26 1.357 0.087
wants to tell me and playing them to my favor. The relationship
with Rebecca has really changed.”
In more general terms, an analysis of the four different dimen-
sions involved in dialog with the dominant element allows us
to light up the passage from a condition of dysfunctional self-
narratives to more organized ones (in Hermans’ terms). In the
earlier condition the voices speak in monolog, in a strong, rigid
hierarchy of self-positions. In this condition the potential for
dialog is limited by a dominant voice. To facilitate a different
organization of repertoires for I-positions would be crucial to the
emergence of contra-positions or meta-positions.
To summarize: self-narratives emerging in the earlier session
are disorganized and monological in form (Hermans, 2006). They
show: a strong, rigid hierarchy of I-positions, in which Rebecca’s
position is dominant; a limited capacity for dialog between voices;
rigid interpretation, and construction of experiences. The other
positions (Carlotta, the metaperspective and others) are con-
stantly pushed into the background; they do not participate in
the dialogical process.
The self-narratives emerging in the latter session are better
organized (Hermans, 2006). They show the emergence of a contra-
position, i.e., the metaperspective. It is strong enough to contrast
the Rebecca position. Even in this more organized system, one
position is dominant over another (the hierarchy still applies); but
the dominance becomes relative: voices take up a dialog with other
voices, negotiating meaning; they alternate in adaptive ways, under
supervision by the metaposition; dominance becomes intrinsic in
organizing the repertoire of positions.
CONCLUSION
Our study is based on the premise that by itself, the motiva-
tional construct may be insufficient in explaining the dynamics
that involve the client who is deciding whether or not to com-
mit himself to a process for change. In imagining the individual
as inhabited by different voices of his consciousness, instead, we
can see that in expressing the problem, various parts of the self
may exist in disaccord with one another. Some of them may keep
the client placed within a regime of non-change. Others, though
undergoing domination by rigid, judgmental parts of the self, may,
instead,become the promoters of a“motivated”request for change.
In distinguishing the voices at play in maintaining the prob-
lem, and at play, as well, when the client requests change, we
have attempted to shed light on several linguistic patterns which
may reveal the passage from one position to another. The results
of our analysis also show that such patterns may be employed
both in characterizing the “psychological profile” of various self-
positionings, and to identify the particular interchange made
possible between or among them.
In light of the theory of the dialogical self, we can, then, under-
stand the client’s evolution during therapy as an improvement
in dialog between or among the various parts. Moreover, based
on results emerging from this study, we would also suggest that
the improvement can be widely demonstrated (and clearly doc-
umented) by the therapist simply by listening carefully to the
particular lexicon used by the client in describing his or her
experience.
In this connection, the analysis of discourse carried out on a
purely qualitative level on the text of interviews during treatment
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proved sufficient for identifying recurrent linguistic patterns, even
at the treatment site. Instead, as regards integral analyses carried
out using SPAD, although the results emerging here may appear
uncertain due to the briefness of the texts analyzed, the same pro-
cedures might constitute a satisfactory means for exploring the
lexicon characterizing a wide range of clinical cases. It would
be interesting, indeed, to trace out a “language of change,” by
determining, e.g., which vocabularies or grammatical forms are
most easily associated with maintaining rigid positions, or with
rhetorical devices that discourage a dialogical exchange between
and among parts of the self.
Clinical psychology has to address bulimia developing spe-
cific protocols and models (Manzoni et al., 2008; Casteln-
uovo, 2010a,b; Pietrabissa et al., 2012) above all in new set-
tings (Molinari et al., 2012) and technology-based scenarios
(Castelnuovo et al., 2003a,b, 2010, 2011a,b,c; Castelnuovo and
Simpson, 2011; Manzoni et al., 2011), improving not only
evidence-based prescriptions (Castelnuovo et al., 2004, 2005,
2008; Castelnuovo, 2010b), but also the “language of change”
that is an important clinical resource very different from the
typical language used in scientific contexts (Castelnuovo et al.,
2008).
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